Bargaining and markets :  By Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, Academic Press, San Diego, 1990. ISBN 0-12-528631-7, xi + 216 pp., $14.95 Paper, $34.50 hardbound by Binmore, Ken
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 3, 260-264 (1991) 
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS 
With the intent of stimulating discussion, this section is reserved for book 
reviews, comments, and letters; your input is welcome. By nature, this material 
may be subjective, reflecting the opinions of the authors; your responses are 
therefore encouraged. 0 1991 Academic PESS, IX. 
Bargaining and Markets. By Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, 
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I recall speaking on bargaining theory in the late seventies and being 
told by more than one unreceptive audience that “bargaining is not part of 
economics.” The publication of this book makes it clear how far we have 
come since those barbaric times. 
In the seventies, bargaining theory was an esoteric branch of coopera- 
tive game theory. Those with metaphysical leanings, who nowadays 
would invent refinements of Nash equilibrium, would then invent abstract 
axiom systems for “cooperative solution concepts.” The properties of 
these systems were then investigated with little or no concern for the 
applicability of the ideas under study. Questions about the circumstances 
in which the axioms might apply were brushed aside. Are your axioms 
principles of social justice? Do they describe what a fair arbitrator would 
do? Are they an attempt to characterize the bargaining behavior of actual 
people? Or do you follow Nash in regarding the axioms as being about 
optimal bargaining between rational agents? If so, what are the circum- 
stances in which the rational agents bargain? Who can do what and how 
can they do it? Not only were such questions left unanswered, but a virtue 
was made of not answering them. So long as one avoids committing 
oneself to a specific interpretation of a set of abstract assumptions, the 
conclusions can be represented as being very “general.” Remnants of 
this attitude still survive. It remains commonplace to argue that the ad- 
vantage of working with cooperative game theory is that it yields results 
of great generality, whereas the conclusions of noncooperative theory are 
very special to the extensive form examined. But, if two slightly different 
extensive forms lead to sharply different predictions of the bargaining 
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outcome, how can there be a “general” result? Things abstracted away in 
the cooperative formulation clearly matter, and ignoring them will neces- 
sarily be fatal to any prospects of realistic application. In any case, it is 
perhaps no wonder that hard-nosed, practical economists felt that the 
activities of bargaining theorists of the time had no relevance to their 
concerns. Although, how a hard-nosed, practical economist could con- 
vince himself that bargaining itself has no relevance to economics remains 
a mystery. 
Nash (1950, 1951, 1953) had already pointed the right way forward in 
his pioneering papers of the early fifties. Although his axiom system was, 
and continues to be, widely misinterpreted, he took the orthodox, neo- 
classical position that one should study optimizing behavior by rational 
agents. He therefore never intended to be the architect of a fair arbitration 
scheme. His view, nowadays widely honored under the name of the Nash 
Program, was that an axiom system like his is useful to the extent that it 
predicts the equilibrium outcomes of suitable noncooperative bargaining 
models. Others, of course, had sought to study the process by means of 
which people bargain their way to agreements. More were to do so later. 
Zeuthen (1930), especially as interpreted by Harsanyi (1977), is very mod- 
ern in spirit. Hicks’ (1934) attempt to model wage negotiation is very 
sketchy by comparison,’ although it received a lot more attention. This 
work, and the later work of Bishop (1963), Foldes (1964), and others, 
incorporated behavioral assumptions that are difficult to evaluate. 
Harsanyi (1977), Selten (see Harsanyi (1977)), and Stahl (1972) were 
among the first, apart from Nash himself, to look seriously at the equilib- 
ria of bargaining problems modeled as noncooperative games. However, 
for various reasons, these preliminary explorations did not capture the 
imagination of the profession. It was not until Rubinstein’s (1982) alter- 
nating offer model appeared that the subject took off. 
The model is very natural. Players exchange offers until agreement is 
reached. The incentive to reach agreement early is simply that the bar- 
gainers prefer an agreement now to the same agreement tomorrow.2 The 
conclusion that a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium exists under mild 
conditions is very encouraging, and the fact that the equilibrium outcome 
can be characterized in terms of an (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solu- 
tion is an attention-grabber. 
A list of the papers that exploit Rubinstein’s breakthrough would be 
long indeed. However, Osborne and Rubinstein’s book makes no attempt 
I Indeed, I have never been able to make proper sense of it. If one computes his “conces- 
sion curves” for the Rubinstein model, they do not cross at all. 
* As Cross (1969) puts it, “If it didn’t matter when the parties agreed, it wouldn’t matter 
whether they agreed at all.” 
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to survey the field. They try instead to chronicle the successes and the 
failures by looking at the simplest possible models that capture the con- 
siderations that matter. The successes are important, but let us first con- 
sider the big failure. 
When I first met Rubinstein, he told me that he had been working on the 
bargaining problem, but had been unable to get anywhere. This turned out 
to mean that he had not been able to make any progress with the problem 
of incomplete information. It is perhaps controversial to say so, but my 
own view is that we are not really any farther on than we were then. 
Historically, the impetus to invent refinements of Nash equilibrium 
largely derived from the discovery that bargaining models of incomplete 
information usually have innumerable equilibria. But the refinement liter- 
ature is not a success. It is a lame duck when applied to simple models, 
but realistic models of bargaining with incomplete information are seldom 
simple. This is not to say that the refinement literature is devoid of in- 
sights. The problem is that we do not know which of all the bewildering 
array of ideas are insightful and which are not. 
I would not therefore recommend reading Osborne and Rubinstein’s 
Chapter 5 with a view to learning how to cope with real-life bargaining 
problems of incomplete information. As an introduction to the type of 
problems in response to which refinement theory was created, it is mag- 
nificent, although not easy reading for a beginner. The sections on mecha- 
nism design and its applications in bargaining will also be found instruc- 
tive. However, the heart of the book is elsewhere. 
So much for the big failure of modern bargaining theory. What of its 
successes? The most important success, treated in Chapter 4, is in making 
it clear what aspects of the environment a modeler needs to take into 
account in predicting bargaining outcomes. When are threats credible? 
What are the bargainers’ outside options? What are the different ways in 
which the negotiations might break down? Studying these questions in 
specific noncooperative models provides general insights that can be used 
to determine how and when to make use of given cooperative solution 
concepts in an applied model. In particular, it is seldom appropriate to use 
the Nash bargaining solution, as was once standard practice, with the 
players’ disagreement utilities set equal to their outside options. 
However, what the book is mostly about is the relationship between 
bargaining theory and the operation of markets. In some markets, the 
price is determined by a centralized auctioning mechanism. In others, like 
the market for houses, the mechanism is highly decentralized. Each house 
that is sold is bargained over. The bargain that is struck will depend on 
various factors. In particular, it will depend on the price at which other 
comparable houses are selling. The aim of Bargaining and Markets is to 
describe the basis of a viable theory of such a decentralized pricing mech- 
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anism, building on the insights of the well-known paper of Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky (1985). 
In brief, buyers and sellers search until they find a partner. Once a 
buyer and a seller are matched, they bargain. The result of the bargaining 
is determined by two considerations: the impatience of the agents, and 
their fear of losing their current bargaining partner if their demands are 
too obdurate. A noncooperative approach allows the construction of 
clean models that often have a unique equilibrium. 
An immediate question of interest is the extent to which the markets 
studied satisfy the Walrasian paradigm when the imperfections become 
negligible. Gale (1986a,b, 1987) has done sterling service on this issue, 
and the book does a good job of getting across the essential ideas without 
becoming overtechnical. However, although the provision of proper mi- 
crofoundations for the use of Wairasian ideas in decentralized markets is 
clearly of major importance, it is not, as one sometimes hears said, the 
only reason that search-and-bargaining models deserve study. It seems to 
me that the prospect of learning about the operation of markets in which 
imperfections are not negligible is very much more exciting. In many 
markets, frictions or transaction costs are far from negligible, and there is 
much mileage to be gained from getting a handle on how different types of 
friction should be anticipated to distort the going price. However, al- 
though his question is wide-open and the tools for its investigating are on 
the table, the opportunities for progress have yet to be fully exploited. 
Perhaps the reason is that the attention of those who know the field is 
continually diverted to the incomplete information problem. 
However, there is room for hope that Osborne and Rubinstein’s user- 
friendly book will open up the area to workers whose interests are primar- 
ily practical. Having used it to teach from, I can vouch for the fact that, 
with the exception of Chapter 5, it is well within the reach of graduate 
students whose interests are not primarily theoretical, and whose mathe- 
matical sophistication is less than optimal. The authors have no time for 
airy generalities. They concentrate on communicating the essentials using 
the simplest possible models, which are explained carefully in full detail. 
This is a well-written book on an important topic. Everyone should run 
out and buy a copy. 
Ken Binmore 
Department of Economics 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 
3 Address from January 2, 1991, to July 31, 1991: Department of Economics, University 
College London, Gower Street, London WClE 6BT, England. 
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